The End of the World (Part 05) The God Mara

 The God(Bad god) Mara

Once Mara, in his role as Tempter, declares, in the presence of the Buddha, that such assets like sons and cattle  are a source of joy to a man, but the Buddha's reprisal was that, on the contrary, they are a source of grief (S. I. 107). All assets, in the long run, turn out to be liabilities.

By giving them up, the arahant has transcended  time,  and the concepts of existence, birth, decay and death have lost their significance for him.   (See A. V.  152; S. IV.  207; Sn. vv.  467,

500, 743, 902, 1048, 1056, 1057). Nibbāna is not only the Deathless (amatam. )  it is also the Birthless (ajātam. )  Epithets of Nibbāna  such  as  the  'not-become,'  (abhutam. ),   the  'not-made' (akatam. )   and  'not  compounded' (asan.khatam. )   suggest the

absence  of  that  fundamental  notion  of  existence  which gives

rise to the relative distinctions of birth, decay and death.

"Monks, there are these three compound-characteristics of the compounded. Which are the three? An arising is manifest, a passing away is manifest, a change in persistence is manifest... Monks, there are these three uncompounded characteristics of the uncompounded. Which are  the  three?  No arising is manifest, no passing away is manifest, no  change in persistence is manifest..." (A. I. 152).

The emancipated-one is 'in the world' but not 'of the world.' For him, the world is no longer the arena of a life-and- death struggle in which he is sorely involved but one vast illustration of the first principles of impermanence, suffering and not-self - of the separative (nānābhāvo), privative (vinābhāvo)

 

and transformative (aññathābhāvo) nature of all existence. He experiences the ambrosial Deathlessness in the very destruction

of  craving  and  consequent . detachment  characteristic  of  that

unique  samādhi  ('khayam virāgam. amatam. panī.tam. -

yadajjhagā sakyamunī samāhito': 'That destruction (of craving), that detachment, that excellent deathless state which the Sakyan   sage   attained   to,   being  concentrated.'   - Sn.  v.   225).

His contemplative gaze is now fixed, not on the 'things' (dhammā) with their fluid, superficial boundaries, but on that nature of things (dhammatā, dhammadhātu) — that causal- status (dhammaṭṭhitatā),.. that causal orderliness (dhammaniyāmatā), namely,  the  'relatedness-of-this-to-that'  (idappaccayatā  - S. II. 26). 'This being, this  becomes:  from  the  arising  of  this,  this arises. This not  being, this becomes not:  from  the ceasing  of this, this ceases' (M. III. 63). 'Whatever is of a nature to arise, all that has the nature to cease' (S. IV. 192). This law of Dependent Arising itself being always 'such,' invariable and not- otherwise (tathatā avitathatā, anaññathatā idappaccayatā — S.II.26), in its contemplation the arahant's mind too is firm and steady. 'Mind is steady and well-freed, and he sees its passing away'  (thitam..  cittam.  vippamuttam. — vayañcassānupassati —

A.  III.  379).  Hence  he  is  'such'  (tādī)  in  his  adaptability  and

resilience, having understood the suchness (tathata) of all conditioned phenomena. It is to one who takes his stand upon  the concepts of existence and birth, that the fear of decay and death can occur.  To  the emancipated one who is fully attuned    to the reality of impermanence by giving up all  standpoints,  there  can  be  no  fear  at  all.  And  when  'Death'  does  come,  as

 

surely it must, he is no more shocked at it than at the crash of an extremely brittle jar ascertained well in advance to be perforated-beyond-use — a 'jar' not-worth-its-name.

The prospect of eluding death by travelling into outer space, has kindled the imagination of the modern scientist also, though, unlike Rohitassa, he did not take it up in all seriousness. He has, however, speculated on the possibility of prolonging human life by flying to a distant star many light-years away in an Einstein rocket. '...Theoretically, travelling at a sufficiently high speed we can reach the star and return to the Earth within a minute! But on the Earth 80 years will have passed just the same. To  all appearances, we thus possess a  way of prolonging human life, though only from the point of view of other people, since man ages according to "his" own time. To our regret, however, this prospect is illusory  if  we  take a closer look at it...' (op. cit. p. 50). No wonder that the prospect is illusory, particularly when it is examined in the context of the Buddha's teachings. Indeed, 'man ages according to "his" own time,' and this, as shown above, was precisely the point of divergence for the Buddha.

That end of the world where one does not get born, nor die, nor pass away, nor get reborn, is therefore,  within  this very fathom-long physical frame with its perceptions and mind. This momentous declaration is quite popular with writers on Buddhism, and perhaps for that very reason, it has rarely enjoyed the privilege of a long annotation. Traditionally too, it does not seem to have been much favoured in this respect, if Buddhaghosa's commentary to the sutta  is any  indication. As Mrs. Rhys Davids remarks: 'It was a great opportunity for exegesis, but Buddhaghosa makes no use of it.' (K. S. I. 86 fn. 3).